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of Values 
Laurence D. Laufer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A campaign is not an election.  No matter how well-financed its 
advertising, a campaign’s success depends entirely on whether voters 
“buy” what is being “sold” on Election Day.  Campaign finance law 
sets standards for how candidates and others finance their efforts to 
persuade (or dissuade) voters in an election. 
The effort to limit the role of money in federal elections is 
reflected in laws that date back over a century.1  In the 2012 federal 
elections, the state of campaign finance law reflected the failure of 
legislation to achieve a comprehensive set of limitations.  The laws on 
the books2 have been superseded by judicially imposed barriers3 to 
limitations.  As a result, complex regulations4 enforce arguably 
vestigial limits.  This campaign finance regime is overseen by a 
partisan mindset5 in Congress and at the Federal Election 
Commission, which also serves to block legislative or regulatory 
innovation.6 
The judicial decision most vilified and celebrated in this area is, 
 
* Partner, Genova Burns Giantomasi Webster LLC, New York, New York.  Mr. 
Laufer heads the firm’s Corporate Political Activity Law practice group.  His 
associate, Alexandra M. Hill, assisted in the preparation of this article. 
 1  Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65.  
 2  See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 
88 Stat. 1263; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. 
 3  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Davis 
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 4  Federal Election Commission regulations are codified as Title 11 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations. 
 5  See Testy Gridlock, THE ECONOMIST, May 19, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21555610; Jonathan Backer, Gridlock and 
Dysfunction on Display at FEC Oversight Hearing, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.U. 
SCHOOL OF LAW, Nov. 4. 2011, available at http://www.brennancenter.org
/blog /gridlock-and-dysfunction-display-fec-oversight-hearing. 
 6  Donald F. McGahn, Caroline Hunter & Matthew Petersen, Hard Truths of 
Campaign Finance, POLITICO, May 8, 2013, http://www.politico.com/story
/2013/05/hard-truths-of-campaign-finance-91084.html#ixzz2SpNL0lEv.  
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of course, Citizens United.7  Viewed least cynically, that decision is a 
celebration of the original American value of e pluribus unum—“out of 
many, one.”  The majority opinion recognizes that political debate is 
fueled by much more than mere giving in response to candidate or 
political party calls for funds to pay for the recipient’s speech.  The 
Court extols the constitutional value of other voices—independent 
voices.8  This gives rise to the controversial conclusion that 
“independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, 
do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”9 
But the Court does not rest on this negative premise.  The Court 
states that independent expenditures are a positive democratic force 
because “an independent expenditure is political speech presented 
to the electorate . . . . The fact that a corporation, or any other 
speaker, is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters 
presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected 
officials.”10 
[S]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is 
the means to hold officials accountable to the people. . . .  
The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use 
information to reach consensus is a precondition to 
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to 
protect it.11 
This libertarian vision of heaven either naively discounts 
persuasion imbalances caused by economic might or astutely shackles 
big government’s ability to control a political process that may be 
ugly but must remain free.  Or, it may do both. 
Because politics is ongoing and campaigns for elections are 
nearly always underway, there is virtually no chance to simply shut 
down the current system and build a new one from scratch (absent a 
very-hard-to-achieve constitutional amendment).12  The rules today 
 
 7  558 U.S. 310 (2010); Sean Higgens, Citizens United: The Dog that Never Barked, 
WASH. EXAMINER, Nov. 13, 2012 3:00 PM, http://washingtonexaminer.com/ 
citizens-united-the-dog-that-never-barked/article/2513358# (“The howls of outrage 
began almost immediately after the Supreme Court ruled on Citizens United v. 
Federal Elections [sic] Commission in January 2010.  It continued for months 
afterward.”).   
 8  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314–15.  
 9  Id. at 357. 
 10  Id. at 360. 
 11  Id. at 339.   
 12  John Celock, West Virginia House of Delegates Calls for Citizens United 
Constitutional Amendment, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 28, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/28 
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will likely be the rules for the foreseeable future, with some 
incremental erosion and adjustment, presumably as a result of 
further litigation.  But that does not mean there is not a strong case 
to be made for various kinds of reform. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  First, I draw a thumb-nail 
sketch of the federal law as it exists today (and these federal law 
concepts generally have their parallels in most state and local 
campaign finance regulations).13  Second, I offer a brief catalogue of 
predominant critiques of three significant components of current law 
follows, taking note of commonly suggested avenues for reform.  
Finally, I turn to the Essay’s main focus: an exercise for identifying 
common values that should be served by campaign finance laws. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME 
Congress has periodically sought to curb the role of money in 
politics.14  In the early 1970s, it supplemented long-standing bans on 
corporate and union spending with limits on individual contributions 
to federal candidates, limits on spending by candidates and others in 
relation to candidates, public disclosure requirements, and a system 
for publicly funding presidential candidates.15  In 1976, the Supreme 
Court pushed back.  In its decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court 
upheld the contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and public 
financing, but narrowed the scope of spending subject to public 
disclosure and struck down spending limits.16 
 
/west-virginia-citizens-united_n_2974556.html; Kathleen Miles, Citizens United: 
California Poised To Become Largest Electorate To Vote On Constitutional Amendment, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 21, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013 /02/21
/citizens-united-california-constitutional-amendment_n_2728560.html. 
 13  For more detailed summaries, see, for example, Money in Politics 101: What You 
Need to Know About Campaign Finance After Citizens United, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 
AT N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, Sept. 28, 2012, available at http://www.brennancenter.org
/analysis/money-politics-101-what-you-need-know-about-campaign-finance-after-
citizens-united; James Bennet, The New Price of American Politics, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 
19, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the/309086/. 
 14  See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); McConnell v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 
U.S. 449 (2007); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).   
 15  Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972); 
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263.  
 16  424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Buckley court upheld spending limits for presidential 
candidates as a condition for the acceptance of public funds.  See id. at 57 n.65.  
LAUFER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:17 PM 
1212 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1209 
 
In the 2002 McCain-Feingold law, Congress placed all federal 
candidate and national party fundraising under the federal 
contribution limits and extended the ban on corporate and union 
spending to electioneering communications.17  After exempting issue 
advocacy from the corporate spending ban,18 the Court threw out the 
ban on corporate (and union) spending altogether in Citizens United, 
while again upholding public disclosure requirements.19 
This decades-long clash between Congress and the Court has 
helped hone the policies that the state may—and may not—advance 
through campaign finance regulation.  Specifically, Congress may 
adopt laws to curb the risk that money corrupts or appears to corrupt 
elected officials, which the Court has narrowly defined to be quid pro 
quo corruption.  But under the First Amendment, as the Court made 
clear, government may not impose restrictions to foster fair 
competition20 or disadvantage some classes of speakers (such as 
corporations) in making their voices heard.21  These principles also 
extend to the financing of state and local election campaigns.22 
Thus, in the 2012 federal elections, candidates, and political 
parties raised funds under contribution limits, disclosed their sources 
of funding, and were able to make expenditures without regard to 
opposing candidates’ levels of financing.23  Corporations and unions 
were forbidden from making contributions to federal candidates and 
political committees (although these entities are permitted to do so 
in many state and local elections).24  Individuals were subject to 
aggregate limits on contributions to federal candidates and political 
committees in an election cycle.25  Political action committees making 
 
 17  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. 
 18  See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 19  See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 20  See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 
(2011). 
 21  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (“[T]he Government may not suppress 
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.  No sufficient 
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit 
corporations.”). 
 22  See Am. Traditional P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). 
 23  11 C.F.R. § 110.1 (2010); 11 C.F.R. § 102.9 (2002); see Davis v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744–45 (2008) (striking down Millionaire’s Amendment to 
BCRA).  
 24  11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2007); see, e.g., 15 Del. C. § 8010 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 106.08 
(2012); Md. Code Elec. Law § 13-226 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-11.3 (2009); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1314 (2004).  
 25  See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C.  2012), 
prob. juris. noted, 133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013) (challenging the constitutionality of the 
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contributions were subject to both source and size restrictions on the 
funds they raised.  The actors who populate this universe—
candidates, political parties, contributors and associations of 
contributors (PACs)—must adhere to limits on funding efforts to 
persuade voters.26  Call them the “Limited.” 
There is another parallel universe of “outside” spending that 
helps or hurts candidates.  The actors here include: individuals, 
corporations and labor unions making independent expenditures or 
electioneering communications.  “Super PACs” are another 
mechanism for outside spending.  A Super PAC is an association of 
contributors raising unlimited sums, including from individuals, 
corporations and unions, to spend on political advertising that is not 
coordinated with candidates.  Also, nonprofit organizations may raise 
unlimited sums from undisclosed sources to pay for advertisements 
and other activity with an apparent aim for electoral outcome.  These 
outside spending activities are not subject to limits on funding efforts 
to persuade voters.  These actors are the “Unlimited.” 
III. CONTRIBUTION LIMITS, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, AND PUBLIC 
FINANCING 
Current jurisprudence rejects the universality of limitations.  
The cliché that money is like water suggests that limitations may be 
an exercise in futility.27  Removing limitations universally, however, 
may be unappetizing as well since experience also teaches that money 
is a means for corruption.28 
Three core components of campaign finance reform are 
constitutional under the First Amendment: candidate contribution 
limits, public disclosure requirements, and public financing.  Each 
component has survived stress testing in the courts.29  While a more 
coherent federal law could be built on these foundations, no grand 
 
biennial aggregate contribution limit as applied to contributions to non-candidate 
and candidate committees.  The case was heard in the October 2013 term of the 
Supreme Court).  
 26  11 C.F.R. § 110.1 (2010).  
 27  See Joel M. Gora, Buckley v. Valeo: A Landmark of Political Freedom, 33 AKRON L. 
REV. 7, 26 (1999) (“Trying to equalize political opportunity and influence through 
limiting political speech and association is a futile task.”).  
 28  Richard Hasen, Opinion, Of Super PACs and Corruption, POLITICO, Mar. 22, 
2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74336.html.  
 29  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding contribution limits, public 
disclosure, and public financing); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 
(2000) (contribution limits); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 
366 (2010) (disclosure requirements). 
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bargain appears likely.30  Indeed, partisan polarization is perhaps 
most acute when it comes to redrawing campaign finance rules.  The 
incumbent protection instincts of those elected under the existing 
framework also help ensure further legislative stagnation.31 
A. Contribution Limits 
Candidates remain subject to contribution limits on the funds 
they raise.  Given the governmental interest in diminishing 
candidates’ susceptibility to corruption by money, that is a good 
thing; or is it? 
1. Critique from the Right 
The candidate’s message to voters is being drowned out by 
unlimited outside spending.32  Candidates risk ceding control of their 
campaigns to outside spenders, who may not be “on message” even 
when intending to be supportive.  The candidate may then be 
unfairly held accountable for circumstances beyond her control.  
Removal of contribution limits would put the candidates on a level 
playing field with these other spenders and enable candidates (or 
political parties) to absorb funding that is now arguably inefficiently 
directed into outside spending channels.33 
2. Critique from the Left 
Large contributions to outside spenders are corrupting 
candidates because (1) the outside spender is not truly independent 
of the candidate and/or (2) the candidate will feel beholden to, or 
threatened by, the outside spender once elected to office.34  Such 
 
 30  See McGahn, supra note 6.  
 31  See Joel M. Gora, Free Speech, Fair Elections, and Campaign Finance Laws: Can They 
Co-Exist?, 56 HOW. L.J 763, 791 (2013) (“[R]emember who is writing the campaign 
finance rules.  The people in power.  Do not be shocked if they write those rules in 
ways most guaranteed to perpetuate their power.”). 
 32  When Other Voices Are Drowned Out, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/opinion 
/when-other-voices-are-drowned-out.html?_r=0.  
 33  Paul Blumenthal, David Axelrod: Remove Campaign Contribution Limits to End 
Super PACs’ Game, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 20, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/ 
david-axelrod-campaign-contributions_n_2725613.html.  
 34  Richard L. Hasen, The Biggest Danger of Super PACs, CNN.COM, Jan. 9, 2012,  
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/09/opinion/hasen-super-pacs (“A candidate who 
receives a large contribution will feel grateful to the contributor, and legislative 
policy could well skew in the contributor’s direction.”). 
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candidates will be prone to represent the interests of big spenders.35 
Here an obvious middle ground would be to increase 
contribution limits to candidates while narrowing the range of activity 
treated as independent.  To the extent that the scope of activity 
treated as constitutionally protected independent expenditures may 
be narrowed by expanding statutory or regulatory tests for 
coordination, contribution limits could become applicable to the 
financing of a broader range of speech. 
B. Public Disclosure 
In upholding public disclosure requirements for outside 
spenders, the Supreme Court found that disclosure enables voters 
(and other audiences, specifically shareholders) to  “react to the 
speech . . . in a proper way,” by understanding the interest of the 
speaker.36  “[T]ransparency enables the electorate to make informed 
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and 
messages.”37 
1. Critique from the Right 
Government should not compel disclosure by corporate 
speakers because they may face economic reprisals, harassment, or 
intimidation that threatens to indirectly limit the speech Citizens 
United said could not be limited.  (This objection is ironic.  While the 
First Amendment allows political speech to be financed by private 
economic activity, the Right deems private economic actions in 
response to political speech suspect.)  Disclosure has become a 
stalking horse for re-imposing unconstitutional restrictions through 
intimidation. 
2. Critique from the Left 
Justice Kennedy posited, “[w]ith the advent of the Internet, 
prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide . . . information 
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for 
their positions and supporters.”38  But the current disclosure regime 
 
 35  Id. (“I am greatly concerned that when Election Day is over and the public will 
stop hearing about Super PACs, contributions to these groups will skew public policy 
away from the public interest and toward the interest of the new fat cats of campaign 
finance . . . .”).  
 36  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010). 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. at 370.  
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has broken down.  As outside spending has increased, the actual 
contributors to Super PACs may be obscured by intermediation of 
their contributions through shell companies and 501(c)(4) 
organizations.39  To the extent Citizens United was a compromise, to 
the effect that limits may be safely removed precisely because 
disclosure is mandatory, the disclosure pillar should not only be 
maintained but enhanced.40 
Could a middle ground be fashioned that clarifies when 
501(c)(4) organizations  (and other “non-political” entities) would be 
required to disclose political activity and funding sources, while also 
imposing new safeguards against illegal harassment and reprisals? 
C. Public Financing 
Public financing is government action that affirmatively 
promotes political speech and gives candidates an alternative to 
funding by large private contributions.41 
1. Critique from the Right 
This big government scheme forces taxpayers to support 
politicians they do not support.  Public financing is pernicious 
because it breeds an entitlement class of politicians and operatives.  It 
is both wasteful and unnecessary since candidates are free to raise an 
unlimited number of small donations and wage successful campaigns 
without need of any public subsidy, as the success of Barack Obama’s 
 
 39  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2013) (“Civic leagues or organizations not organized 
for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local 
associations of employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees of a 
designated person or persons in a particular municipality, and the net earnings of 
which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.”); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2013) (“An organization is operated exclusively 
for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some 
way the common good and general welfare of . . . the community.”).  
 40  Daniel Winik, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer for Corporate 
Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622 (2010) (arguing for 
broader disclosure and disclaimer definitions); Letter from Brennan Center for 
Justice to Elizabeth M. Murphy (Aug. 19. 2013), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/161376997/Letter-to-SEC-on-Corporate-Political-
Spending-Disclosure-Requirement (arguing for SEC to require disclosure of 
corporate political activity). 
 41  Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 
577–78 (1999) (“[D]ramatically unequal campaign spending that re• ects underlying 
inequalities of wealth is in sharp tension with the one person, one vote principle 
enshrined in our civic culture and our constitutional law. Public funding is necessary 
to bring our campaign • nance system more in line with our central value of political 
equality.”). 
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two non-publicly-financed campaigns for president demonstrates.42 
2. Critique from the Left 
Many on the Left embrace government funding solutions.  The 
matching of small donations may spur greater individual political 
activity.43  As public dollars supplant private, candidates become less 
beholden to special interests, more responsive to the general interest 
of their constituents, and more engaged in outreach to persons of 
limited means.  Public funds motivate greater citizen participation in 
elections and therefore create more “small-d” democracy. 
It is hard to identify middle ground solely on the question of 
public funding between those who reject it categorically and those 
who think it a panacea.  Instead of that fruitless quest, imagine a 
public financing system with full disclosure but no contribution limits 
other than those candidates voluntarily accept as a condition for 
receiving public funds.44  Would this be a fair middle ground that 
preserves everyone’s options and objectives, or simply the worst of all 
possible campaign finance worlds? 
IV. AN EXERCISE: WHAT VALUES SHOULD CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 
SERVE? 
The prospect for crafting new campaign finance law, other than 
through attrition by litigation, is depressing.  Each new corruption 
scandal creates an almost gleeful reaction among reform advocates as 
the camel’s-back-breaking outrage that might just finally spur long-
sought legislation.45  With continued partisan gridlock, however, 
American campaign finance law—at least at the federal level—will 
 
 42  See generally Molly J. Walker Wilson, The New Role of the Small Donor in Political 
Campaigns and the Demise of Public Funding, 25 J.L. & POL. 257, 265 (2009)(“Obama 
drew record support from small donors . . . In the case of a campaign in which the 
funds originate with many small donors, the result may well be increased 
accountability, legitimacy, and deliberative democratic involvement.”).  
 43  Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Bruscoe & Brendan Glavin, Small Donors, Big 
Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, ELECTION 
L.J. (2012), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/NYC-as-a-Model_ELJ_As-
Published_March2012.pdf (noting that New York City’s matching fund system has 
increased the extent to which candidates rely on small donations).  
 44  See McDonald v. New York City Campaign Finance Board, 2013 NY Slip Op 
23153 (holding against state law preemption of local law extending contribution 
limits to non-publicly financed candidates).  Note: the author represented the 
plaintiff and the case is on appeal.  
 45  Mike Desmond, Albany Scandals Spur Call for Public Campaign Financing, WBFO 
88.7: NPR NEWS & MORE (May 14, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://news.wbfo.org/post
/albany-scandals-spur-call-public-campaign-financing.  
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likely remain a stilted product of unconscious design for a very long 
time to come.46 
When faced with this kind of reality, fantasy beckons, the fantasy 
to craft radical or comprehensive reform systems,47 or to indulge 
dreams of complete deregulation,48 or to press for constitutional 
amendments to restore corporations to their intended position of 
service to actual human beings,49  or to somehow control the political 
power of money in a capitalistic society.  The remainder of this essay 
indulges a different fantasy. 
Think of a blank canvas and try to contemplate the values the 
American public thinks campaign finance laws should serve in a 
democratic political system.  Then consider the following exercise.  
In every campaign finance regulatory scheme, there are three 
essential players: (1) speakers, (2) candidates, and (3) voters.  What 
rules should apply to each of them? 
Let’s first look at Speakers.  What impressions may be drawn 







 46  See McGahn, supra note 6.   
 47  See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS 
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 264–304 (2011).  
 48  Bradley A. Smith, The Myth of Campaign Finance Reform, NATIONAL AFFAIRS 
(Winter 2010), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-myth-of-
campaign-finance-reform.  
 49  See, e.g., Tony Romm, Specter Pitches Constitutional Amendment in Response to 
Citizens United Case, THEHILL.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 7:25 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/77473-specter-pitches-
constitutional-amendment-in-response-to-citizens-united-case. 
 50  Of course the choice of picture is key for evoking particular judgments.  Here 
I am exercising an author’s prerogative.  Different choices by a different author 
would likely result in a different set of reactions, questions and value-judgments.  
This quandary is useful as a reminder that law does not originate from objective 
sources merely for the purpose of achieving objective results.  Indeed, especially in a 
field like campaign finance, in which some kind of regulation is fundamental for 
bringing some kind of order to an inherently disorderly democratic process, the 
prospect of attaining political goals often frames one’s value-judgments about 
desirable process.  Frankly, how could it be otherwise in a democratic state?   
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What does this painting reveal?  The focus is on a “regular Joe” 
expressing a viewpoint.  Other people—from different walks of life—
are listening to him.  Is government in the painting? If so, is it an 
idealized depiction of American government, or rather of just one 
narrow element of American government at the core of the First 
Amendment, the town meeting? 
If it is not government itself that is depicted, perhaps the viewer 
perceives instead the absence of government that lies at the heart of 
the First Amendment.  Rockwell shows and the viewer “hears the 
voice” of a “common man;” no government is censoring or restricting 
him, except perhaps invisibly and benignly with respect to time, place 
and manner. 
The painting invites a positive reaction to a man who is able to 
“speak his piece” at a public meeting and therefore for a “system” 
that protects his right to do so.  Would that positive feeling be 
diminished if the central figure was painted as wearing a company 
decal or lobbyist badge? 
The speaker is “standing up” for what he believes.  His speech 
has the attention of both the viewer and the painted audience.  The 
speaker is seen as perhaps a little uncomfortable at first but ultimately 
unafraid to be identified with his own speech.  If the speaker is seen 
as authentic, presumably both audiences are giving serious 
consideration to his message. 
Rockwell did not paint a literal speech.  Rather, what is being 
said is left to the imagination of The Saturday Evening Post and 
 
 51  Norman Rockwell, Freedom of Speech [Painting], THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, 
Feb. 20, 1943, available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/powers_of_persuasion
/four_freedoms/four_freedoms.html.  Rockwell painted a series of four paintings 
based on President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech of January 6, 
1941. 
Picture 1: Freedom of Speech 
Illustration © SEPS. Licensed by 
Curtis Licensing. All Rights Reserved. 
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broader American audience.  To fully consider the merits of that 
speech, what other facts might be relevant? 
For example, would it matter if this common man has been paid 
to give his own opinion?  How important is that information for 
judging the merits of his argument?  Further, what if the speaker has 
not only been paid, but is actually offering an opinion that is not his 
own?  To put the issue another way: would an audience’s positive 
feelings about the depicted speech change if the speaker has been 
paid to present a third party’s viewpoint but that fact is kept secret? 
If inauthenticity detracts from persuasiveness, how important is 
it to know the identity of the speaker, and whether he’s speaking his 
own viewpoint without representing another party or merely serving 
as the mouthpiece for another? 
Returning to the painting, just as important as his speech is the 
depiction of audience.  The audience members are shown to be 
listening, giving the speaker his chance to persuade.  The audience 
members are shown to care enough to listen respectfully.  Each 
person is drawn to be free to reach his or her own conclusions.  
Rockwell celebrates how respectful attention informs both freedom 
and ability to think.  “Freedom of Speech” reveals an artist’s pride in 
a system in which ordinary people reach consensus by speaking and 
listening to each other.52 
Furthermore, distinctions of class are not absent from the 
painting: the speaker is dressed in work clothes, listeners wear jackets 
and ties.  Thus the ability to persuade and willingness to listen are 
shown as ideals that are not or should not be constrained by class 
distinctions.  The painting suggests democracy grows stronger when 
people from different walks of life come together to make decisions. 
From another perspective, Rockwell’s painting may be 
recognized as an “independent expenditure” highlighting the value 
of political speech itself—in a very positive way.  The speaker’s 
expression suggests he is not an experienced public speaker, yet he 
appears to be thoughtful, perhaps to recite from memory something 
he has planned to say.  Also, no one in this painting looks angry—
instead we see an idealized civil society thriving by speaking, listening, 
 
 52  In Search of Norman Rockwell’s America: A Resource Guide for the Special Exhibition, 
THE JOHN AND MABLE RINGLING MUSEUM OF ART, available at http://www.ringling.org
/uploadedFiles/Resources/Education/Details/InSearchofNormanRockwelldocentp
acketfinal.pdf (“In 1942 Rockwell attended a town meeting in Arlington, Vermont on 
construction of the local school.  One of his neighbors expressed an unpopular 
opinion, but the rest of the people in attendance let the man finish what he had to 
say.  This, Rockwell decided, epitomized freedom of speech.”).  
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and thinking. 
Finally, the Rockwell painting, much like the celebration of free 
speech in Citizens United, is extremely simplistic—there is no passion, 
armband, or corporate puppet-master that could complicate the 
positive value of political speech.  Were the speaker depicted as a 
demagogue or capitalist tool at a rally where the audience is 
apparently being swayed by an appeal to prejudice or being 
bombarded with misinformation, the viewer would likely have a 
different reaction. 
Speaking of extremes, the next picture reveals character in a 
Candidate. 











Nast is the anti-Rockwell.54  His cartoon indicates a very different 
view of politics: cynical, fearful, mocking, nasty.  The figure depicted 
draws dislike, scorn, and fear.  He is Boss Tweed, a defiant 
embodiment of the corruption of public service by money. 
The cartoon’s subject is especially feared because he wields 
power.  He is anti-democratic in that his only motivation is desire for 
self-enrichment.  That goal may be a competitive virtue in a free-
market economy, but it is contrary to the meaning of public service.  
His desire for payoffs suggests he will ultimately serve only those 
willing to enrich him. 
The money bag seems to be Nast’s manner of unveiling Tweed’s 
secret true nature, one that Tweed certainly strove to conceal from 
public scrutiny up through indictment, conviction, and 
 
 53  Thomas Nast, The Brains, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Oct. 21, 1871 (a caricature of 
William M. (“Boss”) Tweed).   
 54  See, e.g., FIONA DEANS HALLORAN, THOMAS NAST: THE FATHER OF MODERN 
POLITICAL CARTOONS (1st Ed. 2013).  
Picture 2: Thomas Nast, 
"The Brains" 
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imprisonment.55  This is additionally unsettling since his constituents 
generally would not know what goals are driving his actions.  The 
public’s victimization is complete precisely because Tweed’s self-
aggrandizement has been hidden. 
This caricature is a challenge to the electorate to hold 
accountable and ultimately prevent Tweed and other politicians of 
his kind from holding public office or exercising any kind of public 
power.  If this kind of politician should appear, an appropriate 
response would be to have him handcuffed and arrested.  But that 
poses a problem: the public doesn’t know this secret mind.  
Moreover, it is not a politician’s mere thoughts or motivations that 
would be actionable as corruption; only actual behavior matters.  
Before punitive measures may be justified as taken in response to 
criminal acts, this cartoon suggests some kind of proactive limits on 
the politician’s behavior may be needed to deter criminality and 
safeguard the public against possibly nefarious motivations. 
But Nast does not clearly identify any solutions.  Instead, there is 
defiance in Tweed’s posture and self-satisfaction in his girth.  His 
dimensions suggest the task will be daunting and underscore Nast’s 
explicit challenge, “what are you going to do about it?”56  One may 
see in Nast’s cartoon the very essence of the argument for campaign 
finance reform, “money corrupts politicians,” ironically, perhaps, in 
the form of an attack ad. 
Finally, there are Voters.  Unlike speakers and candidates, the 
voters’ role is played en masse.  Voters vote en masse.  In the days and 
months before an election, voters are subject to mass appeals.  What 
image might suggest how voters perceive this process of being 
informed? 
 
 55  Renée Lettow Lerner, Thomas Nast’s Crusading Legal Cartoons, GREEN BAG 
ALMANAC 59, 63 (2011), available at http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu
/cgi /viewcontent.cgi?article=1289&context=faculty_publications (noting that the 
Tweed Ring controlled much of the press with a combination of bribes and threats).  
 56  This question also appears in a second Nast drawing, The Tammany Tiger Loose, 
HARPER’S WEEKLY, Nov. 11, 1871, published shortly before the election and depicting 
a Roman Empire-style arena where the Emperor (Tweed) and his Ring watch the 
Tammany Tiger maul the republic, symbolized by Columbia.  Her ballot box lies 
broken at her side.  See HALLORAN, supra note 54, at 139–40. 
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Unlike the other two pictures, the Pollock painting is not overtly 
political.  For many voters, the act of voting is their primary—and 
perhaps—only overtly political act.  Many factors influence lives lived 
primarily in a non-political space.  Various speech may be hurled at 
voters that later comes to bear on the decisions taken in a voting 
booth.  It is therefore likely appropriate to consider a vision that is a 
blur of images.  Hard as it may have been to read Tweed’s mind, at 
least until revealed by Nast, it is that much harder to assess what a 
mass of voters may glean from the variety of messages generated 
during an election campaign. 
For these reasons, an abstract expression may be as good a 
starting point as any for trying to unravel the role speech plays in 
influencing an electorate.  How does the voter experience an election 
campaign?  Is it an experience of bombardment?  Of mind-numbing 
redundancy?  Of being swayed back and forth?  Of finding 
confirmation of pre-formed conclusions?  Of cacophony that 
overwhelms the ability to find coherent meaning?  Of being 
dissuaded from participating?  Do many voters find they ultimately 
learn little to nothing that helps them reach an informed decision? 
Or, is it an experience where the voter feels enabled to 
intelligently draw together different strands of information from 
many sources, both dominant and secondary?  Does this information 
dissemination help the voter to “think for herself?” Does this process 
allow the voter to see a bigger picture that enables her to make 
choices in casting a ballot to best serve her self-interest and that of 
 
 57  Painted in 1950, Autumn Rhythm (Number 30) is on display at the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City, see http://www.metmuseum.org
/toah/works-of-art/57.92.  
Picture 3: © 2013 The Pollock-
Krasner Foundation / Artists 
Rights Society (ARS), New 
York 
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her community, state, and nation? 
Prior to an election, voters are the central focus of a process of 
information distribution and intake.  Are we concerned that the 
quality of governance is diminished when voters are subjected to 
appeals to emotion, misinformation, one-sided messaging, or other 
“distortions” that impede rational decision making?  Or, do we 
inherently distrust government- and self-appointed communication 
referees (including the press) in a high-stakes game that determines 
the distribution of power in our society? 
The Pollock painting suggests that not all speech is equal.  
Messages come in various forms and sizes, and from different 
directions.  Does that inequality pose problems?  Some of these 
expressions appear contradictory or conflicting.  Other messages 
seem more harmonious, achieving a reinforcing echo effect.  At over 
eight by seventeen feet in scale, the work dwarfs the viewer, much like 
a voter may think expenditures on campaign communications are 
excessive.  But why does it matter how much is spent on conveying 
information to voters?  Does it matter if some spending sources 
predominate—or which sources predominate?  Is there an 
information-distribution process that best suits most voters?  Beyond 
casting a ballot, what other responsibilities or conveniences should 
voters have as active or passive consumers of political information? 
Finally, like the Rockwell and Nast works, the Pollock painting 
may be imagined as an independent expenditure or, perhaps, all 
independent expenditures seen en masse.  Does the resulting 
abstraction sow confusion in the electorate?  Or is abstraction actually 
a clever means of leading voters to conclusions the speaker/spender 
intended?  Either way, does the painting make a case for more public 
disclosure of political spending sources, so that voters may make 
judgments informed by a context that is deeper than the message 
itself? 
V. CONCLUSION 
Unlike most legislation, the prospect of any change in campaign 
finance law is a direct threat to every elected official’s self-interest.58  
 
 58  Bradley A. Smith, The Separation of Campaign and State, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-the-
future-of-public-financing/the-courts-separation-of-campaign-and-state (“It is 
dangerous to have the incumbent government directly involved in shaping the 
quantity and substance of the very debate intended to determine how voters judge 
that government’s performance on election day.”).   
LAUFER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:17 PM 
2013] PICTURE THIS 1225 
 
Sometimes this threat is trumped by a corollary opportunity for 
personal or partisan gain that makes change seem worth the risk.  But 
neither of these phenomena facilitates reaching consensus on reform 
among opposing partisan opponents. 
Ideally, law is the product of rational minds.  Thus, “rational 
basis” is a bedrock principle of constitutional jurisprudence.  What, if 
any, campaign finance rules would be the consensus choice among 
persons who neither hold nor aspire to elective office?  What values 
would their choices reflect?  Would those choices and the values they 
embody withstand scrutiny under the Constitution? 
The majority in Citizens United proclaims that speech directed to 
and among the citizenry is vital for the protection of enlightened self-
government.59  It is this exchange of information that leads to 
consensus.60  Yet it is likely fantasy to think we can seek or find 
consensus on how to re-shape campaign finance law through gut 
reactions to some pictures.  But then again, if we simply cannot trust 
visceral responses to speech and images precisely because such results 
are obtained through manipulation and repetition, haven’t we then 
lost faith in democracy as we know it? 




 59  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010). 
 60  See id. 
